fix: reject whitespace between chunk-size digits (#1257) - #1290
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Motivation: The chunk-size parser tolerates whitespace after the size digits (illegal per the spec but seen in the wild, see #1812), but the `WSP` arm recursed with the same accumulated size and then let parsing continue with the next character — including a further hex digit. So a chunk size such as `5 0` was read as `0x50` = 80 bytes, while a proxy that stops at the space reads 5. That discrepancy is a request- smuggling primitive when Pekko HTTP sits behind such a proxy. The comment referencing #1812 intended only trailing whitespace; the implementation skipped interior whitespace too. The `WSP` arm also had no `cursor > offset` guard, so a size field of only spaces parsed as 0. Modification: Thread a `sawWhitespace` flag through `parseSize`. Once whitespace has been seen, a hex digit no longer matches the accumulation arm and falls through to the illegal-character case, so only more whitespace or a terminator may follow. Guard the `WSP` arm with `cursor > offset` so leading whitespace (before any digit) is rejected as well. Result: Trailing whitespace after the chunk size is still tolerated, but whitespace between size digits, and leading whitespace, are rejected with "Illegal character '...' in chunk start" — Pekko HTTP and a fronting proxy can no longer disagree on the chunk size. Tests: - sbt "http-core/testOnly org.apache.pekko.http.impl.engine.parsing.RequestParserCRLFSpec org.apache.pekko.http.impl.engine.parsing.RequestParserLFSpec" - pass (116 tests); two new tests reject `5 0` (interior whitespace) and ` 5` (leading whitespace), and the existing "incorrect but harmless whitespace after chunk size" test still passes. Verified the interior-whitespace test fails with the fix stashed (`5 0` parses as 80 bytes). - sbt http-core/mimaReportBinaryIssues - pass (internal impl.engine.parsing change, no public API). References: Refs #1812 - narrows the whitespace tolerance to trailing whitespace only
nvollmar
approved these changes
Sep 10, 2026
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cherry pick 7e39060 #1257
Motivation:
The chunk-size parser tolerates whitespace after the size digits (illegal per the spec but seen in the wild, see #1812), but the
WSParm recursed with the same accumulated size and then let parsing continue with the next character — including a further hex digit. So a chunk size such as5 0was read as0x50= 80 bytes, while a proxy that stops at the space reads 5. That discrepancy is a request- smuggling primitive when Pekko HTTP sits behind such a proxy. The comment referencing #1812 intended only trailing whitespace; the implementation skipped interior whitespace too. TheWSParm also had nocursor > offsetguard, so a size field of only spaces parsed as 0.Modification:
Thread a
sawWhitespaceflag throughparseSize. Once whitespace has been seen, a hex digit no longer matches the accumulation arm and falls through to the illegal-character case, so only more whitespace or a terminator may follow. Guard theWSParm withcursor > offsetso leading whitespace (before any digit) is rejected as well.Result:
Trailing whitespace after the chunk size is still tolerated, but whitespace between size digits, and leading whitespace, are rejected with "Illegal character '...' in chunk start" — Pekko HTTP and a fronting proxy can no longer disagree on the chunk size.
Tests:
5 0(interior whitespace) and5(leading whitespace), and the existing "incorrect but harmless whitespace after chunk size" test still passes. Verified the interior-whitespace test fails with the fix stashed (5 0parses as 80 bytes).References:
Refs #1812 - narrows the whitespace tolerance to trailing whitespace only