fix(codex): reconcile the refreshed plan on the shared flight, not the owner's wait - #2933
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 6 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe refresh flow now attaches plan reconciliation to the shared refresh flight. The change preserves reconciliation when the initiating caller aborts. A regression test verifies token persistence and JWT-derived plan updates. ChangesRefresh plan reconciliation
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to After a shared credential refresh, plan metadata is now reconciled even if the initiating caller is cancelled. The change is mergeable with owner awareness because configuration contention or repeated credential transitions can still leave quota-selection metadata temporarily stale even though the credential itself remains valid. Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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리뷰 · 우선순위 73 / 80이 PR은 지금 배경을 쉽게 말하면 이렇다. 같은 refresh grant 를 쓰는 요청들은 문제는 요금제 쪽이다. 지금 HEAD 에서는 고치는 방법은 맞추기를 비행 자체에 붙이는 것이다. 파일 락 안의 fetch/커밋을 회귀 테스트가 핵심을 잠근다. 경로/심볼 - adopt-stored 같은 계정 조인(account-store 541–550행) - 이 PR 이후에도 그 분기 자체에는 notePlan 이 없다. 비행 promise 가 이미 맞추기를 끝낸 뒤에 resolve 된다는 전제에 기대는 설계다. 맞다. 다만 나중에 누군가 비행에서 맞추기를 빼면 구멍이 다시 열린다. 주석이 그 이유를 잘 적어 두었다. 메인테이너의 판단이 필요한 지점
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In `@tests/codex-account-store.test.ts`:
- Line 1076: Replace the fixed Bun.sleep delay in the reconciliation test with
bounded polling that waits until persisted.plan reflects the refreshed value;
retain a timeout/deadline so the test fails clearly if reconciliation never
completes.
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src/codex/account-store.tstests/codex-account-store.test.ts
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Reviewed exact head a6960907381e370bb8dce17bb13491c2695a484a against its base and current dev@6a907d2a3.
The production change is directionally correct: plan reconciliation now belongs to the shared refresh flight, so an aborted owner cannot leave the committed credential and persisted plan out of sync. The focused account-store suite passed locally (37 passed, 117 expectations) under an isolated temporary HOME/OPENCODEX_HOME/CODEX_HOME.
One blocker remains in tests/codex-account-store.test.ts around line 1076. The test releases the fetch and then sleeps for a fixed 50 ms. That does not establish that the detached flight finished its credential commit and plan/config persistence before the assertions and teardown. On a loaded CI worker, teardown can race the unfinished flight, making this test flaky and potentially leaking work into the next test. Replace the fixed delay with bounded condition polling that waits for the persisted plan === "pro" and planSource === "jwt" (with a clear timeout), then keep the credential assertion. This also directly proves the async behavior the regression is meant to protect.
bun run typecheck reports only the existing timeout typing failures in claude-messages.ts and responses/fetch-helpers.ts; the same failures reproduce on current dev@6a907d2a3, so they are not attributed to this PR.
Please update the test, rebase onto the latest dev, and rerun exact-head CI. Because this touches the authentication/account-store boundary, I will keep the security review blocked until that deterministic regression and hosted checks are green.
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…e owner's wait A refresh flight deliberately outlives the caller that opened it: an aborted owner stops waiting while the shared work keeps running and still commits the rotated credential for every joiner. Plan reconciliation, however, still ran only after the owner's caller-scoped wait, and the same-account joiner path returns through the adopt-stored branch without reconciling either. A rotated token carrying a changed chatgpt_plan_type therefore committed while codexAccounts[].plan stayed stale for the life of the process, skewing plan-selected quota projection until a restart or an unrelated WHAM refresh. Attach reconciliation to the flight's committed result so it runs exactly once per flight regardless of which waiters are still present, including none. The joiner-CAS reconciliation for a different account id is unchanged. The regression polls for the persisted plan under a deadline rather than sleeping a fixed interval: the flight is detached from every caller by then, so a fixed delay can pass before the commit lands on a loaded worker, let teardown race unfinished work, and never prove reconciliation actually ran.
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Addressed on exact head The fixed 50 ms delay is gone. The regression now polls for the persisted On the typecheck note, Focused suite on this head: |
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Approved exact head c32576407c1bc120a01b87f45bfe1ae22063146e against current dev@6a907d2a3c6496935ec87d86240a6a12b0ffa00b.
The production change remains the previously reviewed narrow account-store fix: plan reconciliation is attached to the shared refresh flight, so a committed token rotation cannot lose its plan update merely because the initiating caller aborts. The follow-up changes only the regression and resolves the sole blocker: it replaces the fixed 50 ms sleep with bounded polling for both persisted plan === "pro" and planSource === "jwt", then asserts the committed credential. This establishes completion before teardown instead of relying on scheduler timing.
The exact-head focused account-store suite passes 37/37 (117 expectations) under isolated HOME, OPENCODEX_HOME, and CODEX_HOME; git diff --check is clean. The auth/account-store boundary has been re-reviewed and I found no remaining code blocker.
This approval sponsors the exact-head Cross-platform CI and React Doctor runs. Do not merge on stale or failed CI, and keep #2892 open for the separate grant fan-out and generation-scoped routing-state work. The requested lidge-jun review remains for merge governance.
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…car 401s Second review round on f8e7bbd. All three boundaries @Ingwannu reproduced were real; the first was a defect my own previous commit introduced. 1. Provenance now lives ON the health entry, not in a side map keyed by account id. The side map meant "spend whatever health is current when the old credential is found dead", so a G1 401 followed by a G2 save and a genuine G2 503 deleted the 503. `credentialFailureGeneration` is a field on CodexUpstreamHealth, only an entry carrying it can be spent, and any later write replaces the entry along with the tag. `preservedCooldownFields` explicitly drops it, or a cooldown write would inherit provenance belonging to a different failure — which is exactly the ownership bug one level down. 2. Stored-pool sidecar outcomes carry the generation. `sidecarOutcomeRecorder` and both `recordOutcome` closures in openai-sidecar could take a vision or web-search 401/403 and record it account-wide, so the replacement inherited the quarantine. All three now pass `credentialGeneration` for `kind === "pool"`. `main-pool` keeps unfenced semantics deliberately: it has no stored-record generation. 3. `findFreshCredentialForGrant` requires identity equality. Adoption copies both the access and refresh tokens, so a shared grant fingerprint was never sufficient proof that two records are the same upstream account. Both `chatgptAccountId` values must be non-empty and exactly equal; without an expected identity the function adopts nothing. Regressions, each mutation-proven: G1 401 -> G2 save -> G2 503 keeps the 503, and the same for a workspace-denial overwrite; a sidecar 401 does not quarantine the replacement; a same-grant sibling on a different identity is never adopted and is itself left untouched. Removing each guard turns its own test red. 494 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-auth-api, vision-sidecar-e2e, and web-search. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Still open and acknowledged: if #2933 lands first, the alias plan settlement should be unified with its shared-flight path rather than kept as two loops.
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…car 401s Second review round on f8e7bbd. All three boundaries @Ingwannu reproduced were real; the first was a defect my own previous commit introduced. 1. Provenance now lives ON the health entry, not in a side map keyed by account id. The side map meant "spend whatever health is current when the old credential is found dead", so a G1 401 followed by a G2 save and a genuine G2 503 deleted the 503. `credentialFailureGeneration` is a field on CodexUpstreamHealth, only an entry carrying it can be spent, and any later write replaces the entry along with the tag. `preservedCooldownFields` explicitly drops it, or a cooldown write would inherit provenance belonging to a different failure — which is exactly the ownership bug one level down. 2. Stored-pool sidecar outcomes carry the generation. `sidecarOutcomeRecorder` and both `recordOutcome` closures in openai-sidecar could take a vision or web-search 401/403 and record it account-wide, so the replacement inherited the quarantine. All three now pass `credentialGeneration` for `kind === "pool"`. `main-pool` keeps unfenced semantics deliberately: it has no stored-record generation. 3. `findFreshCredentialForGrant` requires identity equality. Adoption copies both the access and refresh tokens, so a shared grant fingerprint was never sufficient proof that two records are the same upstream account. Both `chatgptAccountId` values must be non-empty and exactly equal; without an expected identity the function adopts nothing. Regressions, each mutation-proven: G1 401 -> G2 save -> G2 503 keeps the 503, and the same for a workspace-denial overwrite; a sidecar 401 does not quarantine the replacement; a same-grant sibling on a different identity is never adopted and is itself left untouched. Removing each guard turns its own test red. 494 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-auth-api, vision-sidecar-e2e, and web-search. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Still open and acknowledged: if #2933 lands first, the alias plan settlement should be unified with its shared-flight path rather than kept as two loops.
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Rebased onto dev after #2933 landed and unified the two plan-settlement paths, as agreed on that PR rather than leaving two competing loops. #2933 moved the owner's plan reconciliation onto the flight, because a flight outlives the caller that opened it and an aborted owner would otherwise drop the note entirely. My alias propagation had its own loop inside the credential commit, which would have made two places responsible for the same concern. The committed aliases now travel on CodexRefreshResult, and the flight settles the owner and every alias in one place. That inherits #2933's guarantee for free: an aborted owner still reconciles alias plans, which the commit-site loop could only have done for whoever happened to be waiting. Each alias keeps its own committed generation, since the plan note is generation-fenced. The joiner-CAS branch is deliberately untouched, matching #2933's boundary. 426 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Dropping the alias carry from the unified path turns the plan-propagation test red, so the single path is genuinely covered.
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…nce (#2934) * fix(codex): heal a dormant same-grant record and drop stale 401 evidence Two remaining gaps from #2892. Gaps 1-2 shipped as 8f199fc, gap 5 as 8404983. Gap 3. A refresh rotates the refresh token, but only the flight owner and live joiners ever learn the new one. A non-deleted record holding the same grant that is not participating in the flight keeps a token upstream has just invalidated; its next refresh sends a dead grant, and `invalid_grant` classifies as `revoked`, retiring a healthy account because we rotated its grant and never told it. Owner and eligible aliases now commit in one lock acquisition and one `persist`, so no window exists where some records hold the dead grant. Eligibility is deliberately narrow: same pre-refresh fingerprint, access token, expiry, and the same `chatgptAccountId` as the owner. The rotated access token, refresh token, and expiry move together. An adversarial design audit rejected a wider version of this and it is worth recording why, because the wider version looks obviously better and is not. Repairing only the grant of an alias whose access token had moved on would advance its generation while keeping the old access token. `plan-from-token` reads a higher generation as proof of a newer JWT -- that is how JWT plan claims supersede a WHAM observation -- so a stale JWT could then overwrite an authoritative plan. Worse, flights are keyed by grant and do not record participants, so such a scan cannot distinguish a dormant record from a live joiner; rotating a joiner's grant while preserving its 401-rejected bearer makes the provenance CAS inapplicable and the recursion's freshness shortcut hands the rejected token straight back. This therefore closes gap 3 only for genuinely untouched duplicates. A mixed alias still needs durable grant lineage and verified identity binding, which the current fingerprint model cannot express safely, and #2892 says so rather than claiming otherwise. Gap 4. The reporter described an async interleaving between the generation check and the side effects. That specific race is not reachable: `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` is synchronous and no `await` separates them. The cross-process race is real regardless, since the check is an unlocked read while writers hold the mutation lock, and OS preemption needs no `await`. Health and reauth carry no credential identity, so a stale 401 landing in that window quarantines the replacement. Taking the credential lock per outcome is not available -- it runs with `busy_timeout=0`, which would turn contention into request errors -- so the sequence stays synchronous and re-validates afterwards, restoring the prior health and reauth state when the generation stopped being live. The window remains; its effects no longer survive it. Affinity sweeping is not rolled back: entries already carry a generation and self-invalidate, and re-adding swept entries would be the worse bug. Verification. 420 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-plan, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Six named mutations each drove a test red: owner-only CAS, dropping the identity guard, dropping the untouched-access guard, removing the rollback, and making the rollback unconditional -- the last two failing opposite tests, which is what proves the rollback is conditional rather than a blanket "never quarantine". The gap-4 regression needs a seam. A single process cannot schedule another process's write, so both reads would observe one store and any assertion would be vacuous. `setCodexCredentialRevalidationSeamForTests` stands in for that writer, is undefined in production, and costs one null check. * fix(codex): scope 401 evidence by generation and reconcile alias plans Review fixes for the two generation-boundary defects @Ingwannu and the Codex reviewer found on a798e2d. Both were reproduced on that exact head; both are real, and my original approach to each was wrong. Gap 4 was not closed by a post-write re-read. A replacement can land at any point after `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` returns, so re-reading the store inside it narrows the window and nothing more. The reproduction is simply: record a 401 at G, let the call return, then persist G+1 — the quarantine still applied to G+1. Evidence is now tagged with the credential it describes and checked when READ. `credentialFailureGeneration` records the generation a 401/403 came from, and the health readers drop a failure whose credential no longer exists. The reauth set became a map from account id to the justifying generation; `undefined` is preserved as an account-wide mark so a login flow holding no specific credential still quarantines unconditionally, and an account-wide mark outranks a scoped one. A healthy terminal retires the tag. Alias propagation installed the rotated JWT but not its plan. A plus -> pro rotation left the alias holding a Pro credential while its configured plan stayed plus, and its cached-token fast path never repairs that, so quota scoring and the 30-day projection stayed wrong until a restart or a WHAM refresh. Each propagated alias is now reconciled at its OWN committed generation, so the commit returns `{ id, generation }` pairs rather than ids: aliases need not share a generation and the plan note is generation-fenced. The test seam is gone. The regression now reproduces the real surviving ordering with no seam at all, which is strictly better than the seam it replaces. One assertion in the new plan test was vacuous when written: with one save per record, owner and alias generations coincided, so asserting the per-alias fence passed even with the owner's generation substituted. The fixture now advances the alias so they diverge, and that mutation turns red. 421 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Mutations: unscoping the evidence turns the gap-4 test red while the live-credential test stays green; owner-only plan reconciliation turns the alias plan test red; the owner-generation fence turns it red only once generations diverge. * fix(codex): own credential provenance per health entry and fence sidecar 401s Second review round on f8e7bbd. All three boundaries @Ingwannu reproduced were real; the first was a defect my own previous commit introduced. 1. Provenance now lives ON the health entry, not in a side map keyed by account id. The side map meant "spend whatever health is current when the old credential is found dead", so a G1 401 followed by a G2 save and a genuine G2 503 deleted the 503. `credentialFailureGeneration` is a field on CodexUpstreamHealth, only an entry carrying it can be spent, and any later write replaces the entry along with the tag. `preservedCooldownFields` explicitly drops it, or a cooldown write would inherit provenance belonging to a different failure — which is exactly the ownership bug one level down. 2. Stored-pool sidecar outcomes carry the generation. `sidecarOutcomeRecorder` and both `recordOutcome` closures in openai-sidecar could take a vision or web-search 401/403 and record it account-wide, so the replacement inherited the quarantine. All three now pass `credentialGeneration` for `kind === "pool"`. `main-pool` keeps unfenced semantics deliberately: it has no stored-record generation. 3. `findFreshCredentialForGrant` requires identity equality. Adoption copies both the access and refresh tokens, so a shared grant fingerprint was never sufficient proof that two records are the same upstream account. Both `chatgptAccountId` values must be non-empty and exactly equal; without an expected identity the function adopts nothing. Regressions, each mutation-proven: G1 401 -> G2 save -> G2 503 keeps the 503, and the same for a workspace-denial overwrite; a sidecar 401 does not quarantine the replacement; a same-grant sibling on a different identity is never adopted and is itself left untouched. Removing each guard turns its own test red. 494 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-auth-api, vision-sidecar-e2e, and web-search. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Still open and acknowledged: if #2933 lands first, the alias plan settlement should be unified with its shared-flight path rather than kept as two loops. * refactor(codex): settle alias plans on the shared flight, not the commit Rebased onto dev after #2933 landed and unified the two plan-settlement paths, as agreed on that PR rather than leaving two competing loops. #2933 moved the owner's plan reconciliation onto the flight, because a flight outlives the caller that opened it and an aborted owner would otherwise drop the note entirely. My alias propagation had its own loop inside the credential commit, which would have made two places responsible for the same concern. The committed aliases now travel on CodexRefreshResult, and the flight settles the owner and every alias in one place. That inherits #2933's guarantee for free: an aborted owner still reconciles alias plans, which the commit-site loop could only have done for whoever happened to be waiting. Each alias keeps its own committed generation, since the plan note is generation-fenced. The joiner-CAS branch is deliberately untouched, matching #2933's boundary. 426 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Dropping the alias carry from the unified path turns the plan-propagation test red, so the single path is genuinely covered. * fix(codex): fail closed on absent identity and stop testing past the guard Third review round on 7d95449. All three blockers were correct. Empty account ids are not an identity. `""` equals `""`, but that proves nothing about which upstream account either record was meant to use, and a matching bearer snapshot only shows the two records copied the same token once. Propagation now requires the owner identity to be non-empty and each alias identity to be non-empty before exact equality, and leaves an unidentified dormant record untouched. The sidecar test was passing for the wrong reason. It hardcoded `writerGeneration: 0`, which sits below whatever reconciliation state earlier tests advanced to, so `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` could reject the outcome at its writer-generation guard before reaching the credential-generation logic under test. It now captures the current generation the way a production pool auth context does, and asserts the quarantine actually applied before asserting it is later released — so the test cannot silently stop exercising its own subject. The gap-4 comment described the rollback design that no longer exists. It claimed health has no generation field, reauth is a bare id set, and mutations are re-validated and restored afterwards; the shipped code does the opposite. Rewritten to describe tagging and read-time judgement, including why no re-read can close the race and why `preservedCooldownFields` must drop the tag. 496 pass / 0 fail across the seven-file set run AS A SET, not filtered: codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-auth-api, vision-sidecar-e2e, web-search. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Accepting empty ids turns the new regression red. Noting one difference in evidence: the order-dependent failure reported at codex-routing.test.ts:583 did not reproduce here on Bun 1.4.0, either filtered or as a set. The fragility was real regardless — a stale hardcoded writer generation can short-circuit the guard — so the fixture is fixed rather than left resting on a runtime difference. * fix(codex): spend a stale credential failure before any branch reads health CodeRabbit found a third ownership path on the current head and it reproduces: after a G1 401, a G2 replacement, and a genuine G2 503, consecutiveFailures was 2 instead of 1. Reader-side spending was not sufficient. The transient and workspace branches derive their new entry from the current one, so a spent G1 401 donated its failure count to G2's first real failure and dropped the provenance tag while writing — after which no read could detect the inheritance. The account then reached the failover threshold one failure early. recordCodexUpstreamOutcome now spends a stale credential failure once, before any branch inspects health, so transient, workspace and quota all start from evidence that still describes a live credential. The regression covers both inheritance paths, transient and workspace denial. Removing the entry-point spend turns it red with the exact 2-versus-1 count. Worth recording: my first attempt to mutation-prove this patched the wrong call site — the reader inside getCodexUpstreamHealth rather than the entry point — and the test stayed green, which would have looked like vacuous coverage. Mutating the intended site fails it correctly. 497 pass / 0 fail across the seven-file set as a set. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean.
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…e owner's wait (lidge-jun#2933) A refresh flight deliberately outlives the caller that opened it: an aborted owner stops waiting while the shared work keeps running and still commits the rotated credential for every joiner. Plan reconciliation, however, still ran only after the owner's caller-scoped wait, and the same-account joiner path returns through the adopt-stored branch without reconciling either. A rotated token carrying a changed chatgpt_plan_type therefore committed while codexAccounts[].plan stayed stale for the life of the process, skewing plan-selected quota projection until a restart or an unrelated WHAM refresh. Attach reconciliation to the flight's committed result so it runs exactly once per flight regardless of which waiters are still present, including none. The joiner-CAS reconciliation for a different account id is unchanged. The regression polls for the persisted plan under a deadline rather than sleeping a fixed interval: the flight is detached from every caller by then, so a fixed delay can pass before the commit lands on a loaded worker, let teardown race unfinished work, and never prove reconciliation actually ran.
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…nce (lidge-jun#2934) * fix(codex): heal a dormant same-grant record and drop stale 401 evidence Two remaining gaps from lidge-jun#2892. Gaps 1-2 shipped as 8f199fc, gap 5 as 8404983. Gap 3. A refresh rotates the refresh token, but only the flight owner and live joiners ever learn the new one. A non-deleted record holding the same grant that is not participating in the flight keeps a token upstream has just invalidated; its next refresh sends a dead grant, and `invalid_grant` classifies as `revoked`, retiring a healthy account because we rotated its grant and never told it. Owner and eligible aliases now commit in one lock acquisition and one `persist`, so no window exists where some records hold the dead grant. Eligibility is deliberately narrow: same pre-refresh fingerprint, access token, expiry, and the same `chatgptAccountId` as the owner. The rotated access token, refresh token, and expiry move together. An adversarial design audit rejected a wider version of this and it is worth recording why, because the wider version looks obviously better and is not. Repairing only the grant of an alias whose access token had moved on would advance its generation while keeping the old access token. `plan-from-token` reads a higher generation as proof of a newer JWT -- that is how JWT plan claims supersede a WHAM observation -- so a stale JWT could then overwrite an authoritative plan. Worse, flights are keyed by grant and do not record participants, so such a scan cannot distinguish a dormant record from a live joiner; rotating a joiner's grant while preserving its 401-rejected bearer makes the provenance CAS inapplicable and the recursion's freshness shortcut hands the rejected token straight back. This therefore closes gap 3 only for genuinely untouched duplicates. A mixed alias still needs durable grant lineage and verified identity binding, which the current fingerprint model cannot express safely, and lidge-jun#2892 says so rather than claiming otherwise. Gap 4. The reporter described an async interleaving between the generation check and the side effects. That specific race is not reachable: `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` is synchronous and no `await` separates them. The cross-process race is real regardless, since the check is an unlocked read while writers hold the mutation lock, and OS preemption needs no `await`. Health and reauth carry no credential identity, so a stale 401 landing in that window quarantines the replacement. Taking the credential lock per outcome is not available -- it runs with `busy_timeout=0`, which would turn contention into request errors -- so the sequence stays synchronous and re-validates afterwards, restoring the prior health and reauth state when the generation stopped being live. The window remains; its effects no longer survive it. Affinity sweeping is not rolled back: entries already carry a generation and self-invalidate, and re-adding swept entries would be the worse bug. Verification. 420 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-plan, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Six named mutations each drove a test red: owner-only CAS, dropping the identity guard, dropping the untouched-access guard, removing the rollback, and making the rollback unconditional -- the last two failing opposite tests, which is what proves the rollback is conditional rather than a blanket "never quarantine". The gap-4 regression needs a seam. A single process cannot schedule another process's write, so both reads would observe one store and any assertion would be vacuous. `setCodexCredentialRevalidationSeamForTests` stands in for that writer, is undefined in production, and costs one null check. * fix(codex): scope 401 evidence by generation and reconcile alias plans Review fixes for the two generation-boundary defects @Ingwannu and the Codex reviewer found on a798e2d. Both were reproduced on that exact head; both are real, and my original approach to each was wrong. Gap 4 was not closed by a post-write re-read. A replacement can land at any point after `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` returns, so re-reading the store inside it narrows the window and nothing more. The reproduction is simply: record a 401 at G, let the call return, then persist G+1 — the quarantine still applied to G+1. Evidence is now tagged with the credential it describes and checked when READ. `credentialFailureGeneration` records the generation a 401/403 came from, and the health readers drop a failure whose credential no longer exists. The reauth set became a map from account id to the justifying generation; `undefined` is preserved as an account-wide mark so a login flow holding no specific credential still quarantines unconditionally, and an account-wide mark outranks a scoped one. A healthy terminal retires the tag. Alias propagation installed the rotated JWT but not its plan. A plus -> pro rotation left the alias holding a Pro credential while its configured plan stayed plus, and its cached-token fast path never repairs that, so quota scoring and the 30-day projection stayed wrong until a restart or a WHAM refresh. Each propagated alias is now reconciled at its OWN committed generation, so the commit returns `{ id, generation }` pairs rather than ids: aliases need not share a generation and the plan note is generation-fenced. The test seam is gone. The regression now reproduces the real surviving ordering with no seam at all, which is strictly better than the seam it replaces. One assertion in the new plan test was vacuous when written: with one save per record, owner and alias generations coincided, so asserting the per-alias fence passed even with the owner's generation substituted. The fixture now advances the alias so they diverge, and that mutation turns red. 421 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Mutations: unscoping the evidence turns the gap-4 test red while the live-credential test stays green; owner-only plan reconciliation turns the alias plan test red; the owner-generation fence turns it red only once generations diverge. * fix(codex): own credential provenance per health entry and fence sidecar 401s Second review round on f8e7bbd. All three boundaries @Ingwannu reproduced were real; the first was a defect my own previous commit introduced. 1. Provenance now lives ON the health entry, not in a side map keyed by account id. The side map meant "spend whatever health is current when the old credential is found dead", so a G1 401 followed by a G2 save and a genuine G2 503 deleted the 503. `credentialFailureGeneration` is a field on CodexUpstreamHealth, only an entry carrying it can be spent, and any later write replaces the entry along with the tag. `preservedCooldownFields` explicitly drops it, or a cooldown write would inherit provenance belonging to a different failure — which is exactly the ownership bug one level down. 2. Stored-pool sidecar outcomes carry the generation. `sidecarOutcomeRecorder` and both `recordOutcome` closures in openai-sidecar could take a vision or web-search 401/403 and record it account-wide, so the replacement inherited the quarantine. All three now pass `credentialGeneration` for `kind === "pool"`. `main-pool` keeps unfenced semantics deliberately: it has no stored-record generation. 3. `findFreshCredentialForGrant` requires identity equality. Adoption copies both the access and refresh tokens, so a shared grant fingerprint was never sufficient proof that two records are the same upstream account. Both `chatgptAccountId` values must be non-empty and exactly equal; without an expected identity the function adopts nothing. Regressions, each mutation-proven: G1 401 -> G2 save -> G2 503 keeps the 503, and the same for a workspace-denial overwrite; a sidecar 401 does not quarantine the replacement; a same-grant sibling on a different identity is never adopted and is itself left untouched. Removing each guard turns its own test red. 494 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-auth-api, vision-sidecar-e2e, and web-search. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Still open and acknowledged: if lidge-jun#2933 lands first, the alias plan settlement should be unified with its shared-flight path rather than kept as two loops. * refactor(codex): settle alias plans on the shared flight, not the commit Rebased onto dev after lidge-jun#2933 landed and unified the two plan-settlement paths, as agreed on that PR rather than leaving two competing loops. lidge-jun#2933 moved the owner's plan reconciliation onto the flight, because a flight outlives the caller that opened it and an aborted owner would otherwise drop the note entirely. My alias propagation had its own loop inside the credential commit, which would have made two places responsible for the same concern. The committed aliases now travel on CodexRefreshResult, and the flight settles the owner and every alias in one place. That inherits lidge-jun#2933's guarantee for free: an aborted owner still reconciles alias plans, which the commit-site loop could only have done for whoever happened to be waiting. Each alias keeps its own committed generation, since the plan note is generation-fenced. The joiner-CAS branch is deliberately untouched, matching lidge-jun#2933's boundary. 426 pass / 0 fail across codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, and codex-auth-api. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Dropping the alias carry from the unified path turns the plan-propagation test red, so the single path is genuinely covered. * fix(codex): fail closed on absent identity and stop testing past the guard Third review round on 7d95449. All three blockers were correct. Empty account ids are not an identity. `""` equals `""`, but that proves nothing about which upstream account either record was meant to use, and a matching bearer snapshot only shows the two records copied the same token once. Propagation now requires the owner identity to be non-empty and each alias identity to be non-empty before exact equality, and leaves an unidentified dormant record untouched. The sidecar test was passing for the wrong reason. It hardcoded `writerGeneration: 0`, which sits below whatever reconciliation state earlier tests advanced to, so `recordCodexUpstreamOutcome` could reject the outcome at its writer-generation guard before reaching the credential-generation logic under test. It now captures the current generation the way a production pool auth context does, and asserts the quarantine actually applied before asserting it is later released — so the test cannot silently stop exercising its own subject. The gap-4 comment described the rollback design that no longer exists. It claimed health has no generation field, reauth is a bare id set, and mutations are re-validated and restored afterwards; the shipped code does the opposite. Rewritten to describe tagging and read-time judgement, including why no re-read can close the race and why `preservedCooldownFields` must drop the tag. 496 pass / 0 fail across the seven-file set run AS A SET, not filtered: codex-routing, codex-account-store, codex-plan, responses-pool-401-refresh, codex-auth-api, vision-sidecar-e2e, web-search. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean. Accepting empty ids turns the new regression red. Noting one difference in evidence: the order-dependent failure reported at codex-routing.test.ts:583 did not reproduce here on Bun 1.4.0, either filtered or as a set. The fragility was real regardless — a stale hardcoded writer generation can short-circuit the guard — so the fixture is fixed rather than left resting on a runtime difference. * fix(codex): spend a stale credential failure before any branch reads health CodeRabbit found a third ownership path on the current head and it reproduces: after a G1 401, a G2 replacement, and a genuine G2 503, consecutiveFailures was 2 instead of 1. Reader-side spending was not sufficient. The transient and workspace branches derive their new entry from the current one, so a spent G1 401 donated its failure count to G2's first real failure and dropped the provenance tag while writing — after which no read could detect the inheritance. The account then reached the failover threshold one failure early. recordCodexUpstreamOutcome now spends a stale credential failure once, before any branch inspects health, so transient, workspace and quota all start from evidence that still describes a live credential. The regression covers both inheritance paths, transient and workspace denial. Removing the entry-point spend turns it red with the exact 2-versus-1 count. Worth recording: my first attempt to mutation-prove this patched the wrong call site — the reader inside getCodexUpstreamHealth rather than the entry point — and the test stayed green, which would have looked like vacuous coverage. Mutating the intended site fails it correctly. 497 pass / 0 fail across the seven-file set as a set. Typecheck and privacy:scan clean.
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Summary
chatgpt_plan_type.Why
A refresh flight deliberately outlives the caller that opened it: an aborted owner stops waiting while the shared work keeps running and still commits the rotated credential for every joiner. Plan reconciliation still ran only after the owner's caller-scoped wait, and the same-account joiner path returns through the adopt-stored branch without reconciling either.
A rotated token carrying a changed
chatgpt_plan_typetherefore committed whilecodexAccounts[].planstayed stale for the life of the process, skewing plan-selected quota projection until a restart or an unrelated WHAM refresh.Reconciliation now runs exactly once per flight, for every waiter and for none.
Review boundary
This is a focused correctness follow-up to the caller-scoped cancellation change. It does not touch grant fan-out to inactive aliases, routing side-effect atomicity, credential CAS semantics, or the recovery-budget path; those remain separate slices of #2892.
Verification
dev@6a907d2a3c6496935ec87d86240a6a12b0ffa00b; exact headc32576407c1bc120a01b87f45bfe1ae22063146e.1.4.0+34cbb9a40,tests/codex-account-store.test.ts:37passed,0failed (117expectations).1.4.0+34cbb9a40, wider credential/plan/routing set (codex-account-store,responses-pool-401-refresh,responses-native-main-refresh,codex-plan,codex-routing):227passed. The single non-green line was a WindowsEBUSYteardown race on the shared fixture directory when five files share one machine lock; that same test passes in the per-file run and is unrelated to this change.bun run typecheck: passed.bun run privacy:scan: passed.Checklist
Review readiness checklist
Refs #2892
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests