docs: remove remote runner access details from offload notes - #4623
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe remote test offload document now uses generic remote runner terminology. It removes machine-specific access and transfer details, adds generic validation commands, and retains generalized validation results. ChangesRemote runner documentation
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~5 minutes Change: Other Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The document may mislead readers about how broadly sensitive details were removed and whether all applicable checks passed, but the runtime systems are unchanged and both corrections are localized. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
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리뷰 · 우선순위 50 / 80설명 이 PR(작성자 luvs01, draft)은 역사 기록 바뀌는 내용은 문서 하나뿐이다. 제목을 'macmini-cf' 대신 '원격 러너'로 바꾸고, Host 블록·경로·전송/실행 명령을 빼며, 대신 '저장소 밖 운영 구성에서 관리한다'는 문장과 일반 검증 네 줄( 현재 우선순위 50은 'tip 노출 제거는 당장 가치 있음'과 '히스토리·다른 문서 잔존·draft'를 같이 반영한 점수다. 런타임·테스트 변경이 없고 privacy:scan도 통과했다고 하니, Ready만 맞으면 부담 없이 넣을 수 있는 문서 PR이다. 다만 메인테이너가 '히스토리에 남은 동일 블록을 어떻게 볼지'와 '다른 macmini-cf 언급을 후속 레닥션할지'를 짧게 정해 두는 편이 좋다. 라인 - 메인테이너의 판단이 필요한 지점
너의 추천 이 댓글은 grok-bot이 작성했습니다 |
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abhisheksharma2411
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Checked the redaction for completeness rather than reading the diff, and it holds — with one gap that isn't in this PR's scope but is the reason it was needed.
The sensitive values are gone, repo-wide. Grepped the whole tree at 4507e622, not just the changed file:
| files at PR head | |
|---|---|
ssh-macmini.lidgeai.com |
0 |
User junny / junny |
0 |
~/ci/opencodex |
0 |
So the hostname, the account, the Cloudflare ProxyCommand and the checkout path are all actually gone, not just gone from this document. That's the part that mattered.
One thing I checked and it's a false alarm, worth saying so you don't chase it: lidgeai.com still appears in three files — SPONSORS.md, scripts/privacy-scan.ts, tests/ci-workflows/privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts. That's the published sponsorship contact (jun@lidgeai.com), deliberately allowlisted by SPONSORSHIP_CONTACT_FILES. Not a leak, not related.
The host alias macmini-cf survives in 43 devlog files. I don't think that's a blocker — an SSH config nickname without the HostName, User or ProxyCommand is close to meaningless, and rewriting 43 historical devlogs is a lot of churn for it. Flagging it so it's a decision rather than an oversight. The PR title says "remove remote runner access details", and the alias is arguably not an access detail.
The gap worth fixing separately
privacy:scan passes on the unredacted content. I ran it on untouched origin/dev, where that file still contains all three values:
$ git show origin/dev:devlog/.../022_remote_test_offload.md | grep -cE "ssh-macmini.lidgeai.com|User junny|ProxyCommand"
3
$ bun run privacy:scan
Privacy scan passed
scripts/privacy-scan.ts has rules for tokens, emails and home-directory usernames, and no rule for hostnames, SSH config blocks or ProxyCommand — I grepped it for all three and there's nothing. So this document was publishable, and the next devlog that pastes an SSH block will be too.
That makes this PR a one-time cleanup of something the gate can't hold. A rule keyed on ProxyCommand / HostName / Host <alias> inside a fenced block would close it, and MAINTAINER_HOME_USERNAME is already the precedent for "this specific operator value must not ship".
Happy to open that as its own PR if you'd like — it's orthogonal to this one, and this one shouldn't wait for it.
On the description: "it does not claim a historical purge" is the right disclaimer and I'd keep it. Worth stating the practical consequence too, for whoever reads this later: the values remain reachable in git history and in GitHub's UI for the old commits, so if any of them are still live credentials-adjacent — an internal hostname behind Cloudflare Access is — rotating or renaming is the only thing that actually retires them. The doc change limits new exposure, not existing.
privacy:scan knew about tokens, emails and home paths, and nothing about infrastructure. A working Host block was therefore publishable: the scan passes on dev today, where devlog/_fin/260731_pr_merge_round/022_remote_test_offload.md still carries a real HostName, account and Cloudflare ProxyCommand. lidge-jun#4623 removes them by hand; nothing stops the next devlog reintroducing them. Two detectors, both anchored to the SSH config grammar: HostName value must be the whole rest of the line ProxyCommand command line, matched separately `User` is deliberately not matched. It is an ordinary English word and even line-anchored it fires on wrapped prose — "…the\nuser configuration." and "…the\nuser notice." both matched during development, as did `hostname === undefined ? ...` in a test file before the value was anchored. The username is also the least sensitive part of a Host block, and MAINTAINER_HOME_USERNAME already covers it in path form. A ProxyCommand containing %h is NOT allowlisted. Only a bare %h is. The substitution token does not make the binary path, the access method or the tunnel any less of a leak — allowing it would have passed the exact line this exists to catch. Also moves the repo scan behind import.meta.main. It ran at module scope, so `import { scanText }` executed a full scan as a side effect and a failing scan called process.exit(1), killing the importing test process. Invisible while the tree is clean; adding the detector above broke privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts, which does nothing but import the seam this file exports for testing. Refs lidge-jun#4623
… real host Two problems with this PR as it stood, both the same shape as the leak it exists to catch. The report printed the `ssh-endpoint` value while redacting the `ProxyCommand`. This scan runs in CI on a public repository, so a finding would have republished the endpoint into a public log — the scanner leaking what it was written to detect. `file:line` already locates it for whoever removes it, which is what the ProxyCommand kind has relied on all along. The regression fixture and the rationale comment both spelled out the real hostname and login. lidge-jun#4623 removes those from the devlog; keeping them here would have undone that cleanup and made this file their permanent home. The fixture now uses a synthetic endpoint — the regex cannot tell the difference — and the comment describes the incident without restating the values.
privacy:scan knew about tokens, emails and home paths, and nothing about infrastructure. A working Host block was therefore publishable: the scan passes on dev today, where devlog/_fin/260731_pr_merge_round/022_remote_test_offload.md still carries a real HostName, account and Cloudflare ProxyCommand. lidge-jun#4623 removes them by hand; nothing stops the next devlog reintroducing them. Two detectors, both anchored to the SSH config grammar: HostName value must be the whole rest of the line ProxyCommand command line, matched separately `User` is deliberately not matched. It is an ordinary English word and even line-anchored it fires on wrapped prose — "…the\nuser configuration." and "…the\nuser notice." both matched during development, as did `hostname === undefined ? ...` in a test file before the value was anchored. The username is also the least sensitive part of a Host block, and MAINTAINER_HOME_USERNAME already covers it in path form. A ProxyCommand containing %h is NOT allowlisted. Only a bare %h is. The substitution token does not make the binary path, the access method or the tunnel any less of a leak — allowing it would have passed the exact line this exists to catch. Also moves the repo scan behind import.meta.main. It ran at module scope, so `import { scanText }` executed a full scan as a side effect and a failing scan called process.exit(1), killing the importing test process. Invisible while the tree is clean; adding the detector above broke privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts, which does nothing but import the seam this file exports for testing. Refs lidge-jun#4623
… real host Two problems with this PR as it stood, both the same shape as the leak it exists to catch. The report printed the `ssh-endpoint` value while redacting the `ProxyCommand`. This scan runs in CI on a public repository, so a finding would have republished the endpoint into a public log — the scanner leaking what it was written to detect. `file:line` already locates it for whoever removes it, which is what the ProxyCommand kind has relied on all along. The regression fixture and the rationale comment both spelled out the real hostname and login. lidge-jun#4623 removes those from the devlog; keeping them here would have undone that cleanup and made this file their permanent home. The fixture now uses a synthetic endpoint — the regex cannot tell the difference — and the comment describes the incident without restating the values.
privacy:scan knew about tokens, emails and home paths, and nothing about infrastructure. A working Host block was therefore publishable: the scan passes on dev today, where devlog/_fin/260731_pr_merge_round/022_remote_test_offload.md still carries a real HostName, account and Cloudflare ProxyCommand. lidge-jun#4623 removes them by hand; nothing stops the next devlog reintroducing them. Two detectors, both anchored to the SSH config grammar: HostName value must be the whole rest of the line ProxyCommand command line, matched separately `User` is deliberately not matched. It is an ordinary English word and even line-anchored it fires on wrapped prose — "…the\nuser configuration." and "…the\nuser notice." both matched during development, as did `hostname === undefined ? ...` in a test file before the value was anchored. The username is also the least sensitive part of a Host block, and MAINTAINER_HOME_USERNAME already covers it in path form. A ProxyCommand containing %h is NOT allowlisted. Only a bare %h is. The substitution token does not make the binary path, the access method or the tunnel any less of a leak — allowing it would have passed the exact line this exists to catch. Also moves the repo scan behind import.meta.main. It ran at module scope, so `import { scanText }` executed a full scan as a side effect and a failing scan called process.exit(1), killing the importing test process. Invisible while the tree is clean; adding the detector above broke privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts, which does nothing but import the seam this file exports for testing. Refs lidge-jun#4623
… real host Two problems with this PR as it stood, both the same shape as the leak it exists to catch. The report printed the `ssh-endpoint` value while redacting the `ProxyCommand`. This scan runs in CI on a public repository, so a finding would have republished the endpoint into a public log — the scanner leaking what it was written to detect. `file:line` already locates it for whoever removes it, which is what the ProxyCommand kind has relied on all along. The regression fixture and the rationale comment both spelled out the real hostname and login. lidge-jun#4623 removes those from the devlog; keeping them here would have undone that cleanup and made this file their permanent home. The fixture now uses a synthetic endpoint — the regex cannot tell the difference — and the comment describes the incident without restating the values. Co-authored-by: Abhishek Sharma <abhicse24@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: luvs01 <27862058+luvs01@users.noreply.github.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@devlog/_fin/260731_pr_merge_round/022_remote_test_offload.md`:
- Around line 42-43: Update the redaction statement in this document to scope
its claim only to the current document, or explicitly acknowledge that
historical and other devlog copies may still exist; preserve the stated handling
of runner hostname, account, access configuration, and checkout path.
- Line 68: Qualify the validation statement around “privacy:scan” to avoid
implying complete prepush validation for this PR. Since the change affects gui/,
record the result of doctor:gui:if-changed alongside the existing lint
validation, or explicitly state that only the four listed commands passed.
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…e gate coverage Address CodeRabbit review: state that runner details are not recorded in this document rather than asserting they are absent from the public repository, and state that the remote run was limited to the four listed gates instead of implying full prepush coverage.
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…port (#4975) * fix(privacy): detect SSH endpoints, and stop scanning on import privacy:scan knew about tokens, emails and home paths, and nothing about infrastructure. A working Host block was therefore publishable: the scan passes on dev today, where devlog/_fin/260731_pr_merge_round/022_remote_test_offload.md still carries a real HostName, account and Cloudflare ProxyCommand. #4623 removes them by hand; nothing stops the next devlog reintroducing them. Two detectors, both anchored to the SSH config grammar: HostName value must be the whole rest of the line ProxyCommand command line, matched separately `User` is deliberately not matched. It is an ordinary English word and even line-anchored it fires on wrapped prose — "…the\nuser configuration." and "…the\nuser notice." both matched during development, as did `hostname === undefined ? ...` in a test file before the value was anchored. The username is also the least sensitive part of a Host block, and MAINTAINER_HOME_USERNAME already covers it in path form. A ProxyCommand containing %h is NOT allowlisted. Only a bare %h is. The substitution token does not make the binary path, the access method or the tunnel any less of a leak — allowing it would have passed the exact line this exists to catch. Also moves the repo scan behind import.meta.main. It ran at module scope, so `import { scanText }` executed a full scan as a side effect and a failing scan called process.exit(1), killing the importing test process. Invisible while the tree is clean; adding the detector above broke privacy-scan-meta-key.test.ts, which does nothing but import the seam this file exports for testing. Refs #4623 * fix(privacy): redact the ProxyCommand value, and correct the scanText doc Review follow-ups from @lidge-jun on #4734. The scanText JSDoc still claimed the module runs its scan on import — the thing this PR removed. Left as-is, the next contributor writes against a side effect that no longer exists. Now states the import is side-effect free and why the seam exists at all. ProxyCommand findings move to their own kind and join REDACTED_FINDING_KINDS. The value carries the binary path, the access method and the tunnel options, and it was being echoed verbatim into stderr and CI logs — which are far more widely readable than the diff it was caught in. A bare HostName stays visible: that one is the context a reviewer needs to find the line. ...:44 ssh-endpoint: HostName ssh-macmini.lidgeai.com ...:46 ssh-proxy-command: <redacted> Also indents the runScan body a level, which the extraction had left flat. * fix(privacy): redact the endpoint too, and stop the fixture pinning a real host Two problems with this PR as it stood, both the same shape as the leak it exists to catch. The report printed the `ssh-endpoint` value while redacting the `ProxyCommand`. This scan runs in CI on a public repository, so a finding would have republished the endpoint into a public log — the scanner leaking what it was written to detect. `file:line` already locates it for whoever removes it, which is what the ProxyCommand kind has relied on all along. The regression fixture and the rationale comment both spelled out the real hostname and login. #4623 removes those from the devlog; keeping them here would have undone that cleanup and made this file their permanent home. The fixture now uses a synthetic endpoint — the regex cannot tell the difference — and the comment describes the incident without restating the values. Co-authored-by: Abhishek Sharma <abhicse24@gmail.com> * docs(privacy): put the import-side-effect note on the function it guards Two review nits from the PR gate. `scanText`'s JSDoc repeated the whole import-side-effect explanation that `runScan` already carried, so an edit to either left the other stale. It now states only its own concern — the test seam — and points at `runScan` for the rest. `runScan`'s JSDoc sat above the `if (import.meta.main)` guard rather than the function it describes, so tooling and readers attached it to the wrong construct. Moved onto the declaration; the guard reads fine unannotated. * fix(privacy): evaluate SSH endpoint allowances per token The allowance asked whether a directive value *contained* something allowlisted. For HostName that is the same as asking about its single token, but a ProxyCommand value is a command line, so one reserved name or one leading substitution cleared the whole line and the real endpoint with it. Two bypasses followed, both now pinned as tests: a value beginning with "$" was allowed outright by the templated-prefix rule, and an unanchored reserved-name test cleared a command whose proxy hop was example.com while it named the real host three tokens later. The same unanchoring read example.com.internal-buildfarm.net as documentation. Every token must now be a placeholder, and every placeholder rule is anchored to the whole token. A ProxyCommand is a leak by default; only a wholly templated value is documentation. Also accept the two ssh_config spellings that hid a directive from the detector entirely: a trailing "# comment" after a HostName value, and the "ProxyCommand=value" form. The "HostName=value" form is deliberately not accepted, because that shape is ordinary TypeScript and three such lines are in src/server/ports.ts and src/server/port-reclaim.ts today. Co-authored-by: Abhishek Sharma <abhicse24@gmail.com> * test(layout): register the SSH endpoint privacy test tests/test-layout.test.ts requires every test file to resolve to a domain, and tests/test-layout-tooling.test.ts checks the resolver against an independent fixture oracle. "privacy-scan-ssh-endpoint" is not covered by the ci-workflows regex seeds, so the new file needs an explicit entry in both tables. Co-authored-by: Abhishek Sharma <abhicse24@gmail.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Abhishek Sharma <abhicse24@gmail.com>
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Summary
Remove remote runner access details from public offload notes while retaining generic operational guidance. This updates the checked-in document only; it does not claim a historical purge or changes to live remote systems.
Current author verification
b61811020ace583e231fafcb82782284feb21911(tree95fdc0fcea7e8efb8c9f69feb67f427aa759b894); merges dev through9052ddf.9052ddfcleanly with no conflicts.bun run structure:checkandbun run privacy:scanpass on the merged head. Fork CI run 35238829923 completed: every lane green except the dispatch-onlymacos control30-minute cap.Review readiness checklist
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