Reject connect - #56
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Request validators check the Host header of each request, but a request tunneled through CONNECT is delivered to whatever the CONNECT line named. A client holding a secret scoped to one host could CONNECT to another host and send a tunneled request with the allowed host in its Host header, and the secret would be injected and delivered to the CONNECT target. The shipped client never uses CONNECT, so refuse it outright.
The dial guard that refuses private, loopback, and fdaa::/8 addresses was only installed when the hostnames list contained a literal IP, so a deployment configured with DNS names or nothing at all ran with no guard. Install it unconditionally. Tests that run their upstream on loopback opt out with AllowPrivateUpstreams.
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